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Administrative Law
by Terri L. Carver'
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Eleventh Circuit ruled on numerous administrative law issues in
1997, including exhaustion of administrative remedies, deference to
agency legal interpretations, and the time period for appealing federal
agency actions. The Eleventh Circuit also took a close look at the scope
of an inspector general's subpoena powers and clarified the role of
agency investigations versus inspectors general investigations.
The Eleventh Circuit decided several cases of first impression in 1997.
In a case of first impression nationwide,1 the Eleventh Circuit ruled
that determining the amount of attorney fees in an administrative case
was a collateral issue.' Therefore, the issue of attorney fees did not toll
the time period for seeking judicial review of an administrative decision
on the merits.'
The Eleventh Circuit also reviewed two cases of first impression
within the circuit.4 First, the court held that a claimant who filed suit
against an insolvent financial institution (later taken over by the
Resolution Trust Corporation ("RTC")) was not required to exhaust
administrative remedies when the defendant RTC initially elected to
proceed with the suit.' The claims procedures against insolvent

* Terri L. Carver is an environmental attorney with the United States Air Force. This
Article does not represent the views of the United States Air Force. University of
Nebraska (B.A., 1980); Marquette University Law School (J.D., 1984); George Washington
University Law School (LL.M., Environmental Law, 1996).
1. Fluor Constructors, Inc. v. Reich, 111 F.3d 94 (11th Cir. 1997). See discussion infra
Part II.B.
2. 111 F.3d at 95.
3. Id.
4. Damiano v. FDIC, 104 F.3d 328 (11th Cir. 1997); Bradberry v. Director, Office of
Workers' Compensation Programs, 117 F.3d 1361 (11th Cir. 1997). See discussion infra
Parts II.A and III.B.
5. 104 F.3d at 335.
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financial institutions, as set forth in the Financial Institutions Reform,
Recovery, and Enforcement Act ("FIRREA"), -governed the court's
decision.' In the second case, the court ruled the legal standard for
survivor's benefits under the Black Lung Benefits program was whether
black lung disease "hastened" the miner's death.' The court deferred to
the agency's interpretation of its regulations on the Black Lung Benefits
program.9
The court decided several cases involving exhaustion of administrative
remedies. First, the Eleventh Circuit ruled plaintiffs need not exhaust
state administrative remedies if the agency action is being challenged as
a violation of federal law.10 Second, the court found the three-part test
for a waiver of the exhaustion requirement was not met because plaintiff
failed to prove exhaustion of administrative remedies would cause
irreparable harm or be futile." Finally, the court clarified that a third
party cannot later challenge in court an agency decision that the original
party did not appeal through the agency's administrative process. 2
In two cases, the Eleventh Circuit refused to defer to agency statutory
interpretations the court deemed inconsistent with the underlying
statutes.' 3 However, the court did defer to agency regulatory interpretations as to commercial pilot qualifications, 4 eligibility requirements
in the Black Lung Benefits program,"5 and Medicare reimbursement of
bad debt claims.'
The Eleventh Circuit ruled the statutory time period for challenging
an agency regulation did not apply if the plaintiff challenged the agency
regulation as violative of the statute. 7 The court also clarified that an
agency did not engage in improper retroactive rule-making if it
6. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 12 U.S.C.).
7. 104 F.3d at 333-35.
8. 117 F.3d at 1367.
9. Id.
10. Tallahassee Meml Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. Cook, 109 F.3d 693, 702 (11th Cir. 1997). See
discussion infra Part II.A.
11. Crayton v. Callahan, 120 F.3d 1217, 1220, 1222 (11th Cir. 1997). See discussion
infra Part II.A.
12. Bama Tomato Co. v. United States Dep't of Agric., 112 F.3d 1542, 1548(11th Cir.
1997). See discussion infra Part II.A.

13. Legal Envtl. Assistance Found., Inc. v. EPA, 118 F.3d 1467, 1477 (11th Cir. 1997);
Tallahassee Mem'l, 109 F.3d at 703. See discussion infra Part III.A.
14. Zukas v. Hinson, 124 F.3d 1407, 1411 (11th Cir. 1997). See discussion infra Part
III.B.
15. Bradberry,117 F.3d at 1366-67. See discussion infra Part III.B.
16. University Health Servs., Inc. v. Health & Human Servs., 120 F.3d 1145, 1150
(11th Cir. 1997). See discussion infra Part IfI.B.

17. Legal Envtl. Assistance Found., 118 F.3d at 1473. See discussion infra Part II.B.
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disallowed an old claim based on new information not available at the
time the claim was paid."8
Finally, the Eleventh Circuit upheld Inspector General ("IG")
subpoenas issued in a fraud investigation on disaster payments. 9 The
court distinguished the IG's subpoena powers from agency compliance
audits that were the agency's prerogative.2 °
II.

A.

JURISDICTION TO REVIEW AGENCY ACTIONS

Exhaustion ofAdministrative Remedies

In Damiano v. FDIC,2 the Eleventh Circuit held that defendant RTC
failed to give timely notice of administrative claims procedures to the
plaintiff who sued an insolvent financial institution now in RTC
receivership.22 Under FIRREA, 2 the RTC was deemed to have elected
to proceed with the lawsuit; therefore, the plaintiff was not required to
exhaust administrative remedies. 24
In 1990, plaintiff Irene Damiano filed an age discrimination suit
against her former employer, Amerifirst Federal Savings & Loan
25
Association ("Amerifirst"), prior to Amerifirst being declared insolvent.
The RTC was appointed the receiver of Amerifirst in March 1991.26
Soon after its appointment as receiver, the RTC substituted itself as
More than eight months
defendant in the age discrimination suit.2
passed before RTC raised the issue of plaintiff's failure to exhaust
In 1994, the district court dismissed the
administrative remedies.'

18. Uniuersity Health Servs., 120 F.3d at 1153. See discussion infra Part IV.
19. Inspector General of the United States Dep't of Agric. v. Glenn, 122 F.3d 1007, 1012
(11th Cir. 1997). See discussion infra Part IV.
20. Glenn, 122 F.3d at 1010-11.
21. 104 F.3d 328 (11th Cir. 1997).
22. Id. at 335.
23. See supra note 6.
24. 104 F.3d at 335.
25. Id. at 330-31.
26. Id. The court noted that on "December 31, 1985, the RTC dissolved and the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC') succeeded to the RTC as receiver. 12 U.S.C.
§ 1441a(m). To avoid confusion, however, we will consistently refer to the receiver as the
RTC in this opinion." Id. at 331 n.1. Therefore, my discussion of the case will also refer
to the defendant as the RTC, not the FDIC.
27. 104 F.3d at 331.
28. Id. at 332. The court castigated the RTC for its failure to notify plaintiff by mail
of the administrative claims process as required by FIRREA. ld. at 331 n.3, 333-34 n.6.
Plaintiff did not argue that RTC's failure to notify her as required by FIRREA excused her
from exhausting her administrative remedies. Id. at 331 n.3. Rather, plaintiff argued RTC
elected to proceed with the suit when RTC failed to timely request a stay pending
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case, holding that "FIRREA created a mandatory administrative
exhaustion requirement for all claims, including those asserted in a prereceivership lawsuit." 9 The district court ruled the plaintiff had
"forfeited her claim by failing to exhaust her administrative remedies." 0
The Eleventh Circuit, in a case of first impression in the circuit,3'
reversed the district court32 and held FIRREA did not impose a
mandatory administrative exhaustion process for claims asserted in prereceivership lawsuits. 3 "[T]he [FIRREA] statute does not provide for
an automatic stay of all pre-receivership actions, pending exhaustion of
the administrative process ....

It specifically gives the receiver the

right, but not the duty, to stay a pending action within the first ninety
days of being appointed as receiver. 4
Here, the RTC clearly knew of plaintiff's pending age discrimination
suit because it substituted itself as the successor party in the lawsuit
within a month of its receivership appointment.3 5 Yet, more than eight
months passed before RTC protested plaintiff's failure to exhaust
administrative remedies."6 The Eleventh Circuit held:
[The RTC) elected to proceed with this lawsuit judicially by failing to
timely insist on the use of its administrative processes. To hold
otherwise would be to allow the RTC to ignore a lawsuit of which it
clearly was aware and in which it had intervened, thus luring the
claimant to assume that the RTC [wa]s ready to deal with it as a
litigant, while "[i]n reality,.., the receiver l[ay] in ambush, awaiting
expiration of the administrative deadline so that it [could] dispose of
the claim without consideration of its merits."7
The court noted that subject matter jurisdiction of pending prereceivership lawsuits, such as plaintiff's age discrimination lawsuit,
"vested" at the time it was filed with the court.38 The receivership did
not disturb the district court's jurisdiction.39 The FIRREA pre-receivership provisions were in sharp contrast to the FIRREA post-receivership

exhaustion of administrative remedies. Id. at 332.
29. Id. at 332.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 330.
32. Id. at 335.
33, Id. at 334.
34. Id. at 333-34.
35. Id. at 331.
36. Id. at 335.
37. Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting Whatley v. RTC, 32 F.3d 905, 908 (5th Cir. 1994)).
38. Id. at 333.
39. Id.
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claims process,' which imposed a mandatory administrative process
prior to suit as a jurisdictional prerequisite.4 '

In Tallahassee Memorial Regional Medical Center v.Cook,4" the

Eleventh Circuit held the plaintiffs' failure to exhaust state administrative remedies in challenging Medicaid hospital reimbursements could not
bar a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim alleging a violation of federal law.43
Plaintiffs" challenged Florida's failure to reimburse them for care of
adolescent psychiatric patients after inpatient care was no longer
required but prior to patients' placement in outpatient alternative
treatment facilities."' Plaintiffs said reimbursement was required by
the Boren Amendment,4 under the federal Medicaid program. 47 The
court agreed.'
The court rejected Florida's argument that plaintiffs had not
exhausted the state's administrative appeals process on reimbursements.4 9 "[A] claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cannot be barred by a
plaintiff's failure to exhaust state remedies with respect to unreviewed
administrative actions ....The courts... have found this rule applies
with equal force to cases under the [Boren] Amendment.5 0
The Eleventh Circuit clarified the criteria for a waiver of the
jurisdictional prerequisite to exhaust administrative remedies, in
Crayton v.Callahan.5 In Crayton, plaintiffs alleged the Social Security
Administration had a duty to determine if applicants to the Social

40.

Id. at 333-34.

41. Id.
42. 109 F.3d 693 (11th Cir. 1997) (per curiam). The Eleventh Circuit adopted the
district court opinion, which is set forth in Appendix A of the Eleventh Circuit decision.
Id. at 694-95. Therefore, citation to case facts and legal analysis are to the district court
opinion in Appendix A. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed all the district court holdings except
for the district court's directives to the Florida State Legislature, which the Eleventh
Circuit vacated. Id.
43. Id. at 702.
44. Plaintiffs were two Florida hospitals, Tallahassee Memorial Regional Medical
Center, Inc. and Florida Hospital Medical Center, which were "fully qualified to provide
in-patient psychiatric care for adults and adolescents under Florida's Medicaid program."
Id. at 695.
45. Id at 700. The court noted the "extreme shortage of spaces at alternative care
facilities for the adolescent psychiatric patients." Id,Plaintiffs found themselves forced
to keep adolescent patients within their facilities until slots opened up in these alternative
care facilities, because the patients could not be released in an unsupervised setting. Id.
46. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)(A) (1994).
47. 109 F.3d at 696.
48. Id. at 703.
49. Id. at 702.
50. Id. (citations omitted).
51. 120 F.3d 1217 (11th Cir. 1997).
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Security Disability Insurance ("SSDI") program were mentally retarded,
even if mental retardation was not the basis of the initial disability
application.52
The Eleventh Circuit noted the federal SSDI statute set forth two
jurisdictional prerequisites for judicial review of agency decisions.53
"First,the individual must have presented a claim for benefits to the
Secretary. Second, the claimant must have exhausted the administrative remedies. This means claimant must have completed each of the
steps of the administrative review process unless exhaustion has been
waived."" In this case, plaintiffs had not completed the administrative
process prior to filing suit alleging an SSDI violation.55
The Eleventh Circuit applied a three-part test to determine if the
exhaustion requirement had been or should be waived: "(1) are the
issues entirely collateral to the claim for benefits; (2) would failure to
waive cause irreparable injury; and (3) would exhaustion be futile."6
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's findings"7 that
plaintiffs failed to prove exhaustion of administrative remedies would
cause irreparable harm or be futile."8
After reviewing three United States Supreme Court cases on waiver
of the administrative exhaustion requirement, 9 the Eleventh Circuit
summarized the "rules" regarding exhaustion of administrative remedies
as follows:
The agency may always waive the exhaustion requirement. It may be
held to have done so by failing to challenge the sufficiency of the
allegations in plaintiffs' complaint .... Exhaustion may be excused
when the only contested issue is constitutional, collateral to the
consideration of claimant's claim, and its resolution therefore falls
outside the agency's authority ....

Exhaustion may be impractical

and inconsistent with the exhaustion principles when a judicial
determination has been made that the agency's procedure is illegal.'
The Eleventh Circuit modified the district court's dismissal with
prejudice to dismissal without prejudice to allow plaintiffs to seek
judicial review once they had exhausted administrative remedies. 1
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58,
59.
60.
61.

Id. at 1220.
Id.
Id (citation omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1222.
Id. at 1221.
Id. at 1222.
Id.
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In Bama Tomato Co. v. United States Department of Agriculture,62
the Eleventh-Circuit ruled that failure to appeal a U.S. Department of
Agriculture's ("USDA") employment bar under the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act ("PACA") program" barred a subsequent judicial
challenge to the employment bar.6 The USDA had revoked the license
of Mims Produce for PACA violations.65 The USDA had found Jerry
Mims was connected to Mims Produce and imposed a one-year employment bar."s Thus, no PACA participant could employ Mr. Mims during
the one-year barment6 7 The USDA had notified Mr. Mims of his
administrative appeal rights." Mr. Mims did not appeal the USDA
employment bar.69
Plaintiff, Bama Tomato Company, hired Mr. Mims during the barment
period in violation of USDA regulations.70 The USDA sanctioned the
Bama Tomato Company ("Bama") and Bama appealed the sanction. 7
Bama asked the court to review the USDA's initial decision to bar Mr.
Mims from the PACA program.72 The Eleventh Circuit refused to hear
this issue because Mr. Mims had failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies:
Mims ... waived his right to contest the issue of whether he was

responsibly connected to Mims Produce by failing to challenge directly
the determination .... Thus, Bama [Tomato Company] cannot step
into Mims' shoes and challenge the final determination that Mims
[wa]s subject to the employment bar provisions of the PACA.73
Statute of Limitations
In Fluor Constructors, Inc. v. Reich,74 a case of first impression
nationwide, the Eleventh Circuit held the Budinich rule" that reimbursement of attorney fees is a collateral issue also applied to adminis-

B.

62.

112 F.3d 1542 (11th Cir. 1997).

63.
64.
65.
66.

7 U.S.C. §§ 499a-499s (1994 & Supp. I 1995).
112 F.3d at 1548.
I&
Id.

67. Id

68. Id.
69. Id. at 1544.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1544-45.

72. Id. at 1546.
73. Id. at 1548.
74.

111 F.3d 94 (11th Cir. 1997).

75. The United States Supreme Court established this rule in Budinich v. Becton
Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196 (1988).
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trative cases.76 Thus, issues regarding attorney fees do not toll the
time period for seeking judicial review of an administrative decision on
the merits.77 Fluor Constructors ("Fluor"), the plaintiff-employer,
challenged an adverse Labor Secretary's decision awarding back pay to
one of Fluor's employees, Tritt, under a federal whistle-blower protection
statute."
The Labor Secretary found Fluor violated the nuclear
industry whistle-blower statute when Fluor fired Tritt in reprisal for
Tritt's questioning safety practices at the Crystal River Power Plant.7"
During the administrative review process, this case went back and
forth between the administrative law judge ("AIJ") and the Labor
Secretary:
The [Labor Secretary's] order [reversing the AL's initial decision]
remanded the case to the AU for a determination of back pay,
benefits, and, if necessary, compensatory damages [to be paid to Tritt].
Fluor subsequently sought review of the Secretary's order in this court,
but we determined jurisdiction was lacking because Fluor was not
appealing a final order.
On March 16, 1995, the [Labor] Secretary issued an order upholding
the AU's decision on damages and remanding for the sole purpose of
determining the amount of attorney's fees Fluor owed pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 5851(b)(2)(B).10
Thus, the Secretary issued a decision on the merits on March 16, 1995.
The Labor Secretary subsequently adopted the ALJ's determination on
the attorney fees issue."'
Plaintiff did not file his appeal of the Secretary's order on the merits
until June 29, 1995, more than sixty days after the Secretary's March
16, 1995 decision." Apparently, plaintiff, having been burned once on
the timeliness of his appeal, waited until the AIU resolved the attorney
fees issue before appealing the Secretary's decision. 83
76. 111 F.3d at 95.
77. Id. at 96.
78. Id. at 95.
79.

Id.

80. Id.
81.
82.

Id.
Id. at 96.

83. Senior Circuit Judge Hill, in his concurring opinion, traced the chronology of
plaintiffs actions, including plaintiffs initial appeal that was denied for being filed
prematurely. Id. at 97 (Hill, J., concurring). Judge Hill noted that when the Secretary
approved the AU's order on Tritt's back pay and other damages, the Secretary remanded
the issue of attorney fees to the ALU. Id.
The employer [Fluor], guarding against the error of prematurity, withheld an
appeal until the AUd had acted on the remand. When this was done, and the
Secretary had, finally, ended the proceedings by upholding the AUJ's decision in
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The Eleventh Circuit started its analysis by noting Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 15(a) 4 requires a party to file a petition for review
of a final decision of a Secretary "within the time prescribed by law." 5
Under the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974,86 "petitions for review
filed within sixty days
in the United States courts of appeals 'must
8 7 be
from the issuance of the Secretary's order.'"
The court then analyzed whether the rule established in Budinich
should be applied in this case. In Budinich, the United States Supreme
Court held "the imposition and the amount of attorney's fees are always
collateral to the merits of the action."' The Eleventh Circuit ruled:
Where an order disposes of a party's substantive claims, but does not
dispose of claims relating to attorney's fees, the time for appeal of the
substantive claims starts to run from the date of the first order unless
the district court grants a delay .... Though Budinich considered the
timeliness of an appeal from a district court judgment rather than a
review of a final administrative decision, the Supreme Court's analysis
does not allow for the establishment of a different rule for administrative cases. We hold that for the purposes of an appeal from an
administrative agency, both the imposition and the amount of
attorney's fees are collateral to the merits of an action.89
The court also held Fluor's case did not meet the "unique circumstances"
doctrine for granting the appeal despite its untimeliness.' Thus, the
Eleventh Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction." As an aside, the court said Fluor would not have won on
appeal anyway.9 2

its entirety, the employer appealed to us.
"Too late!" said the Secretary in the motion to dismiss this appeal. The
employer should have appealed regardless of the remand to fix attorney[] fees.
We agree, the employer's appeal is to be "dismissed if you do and dismissed if

you don't!"
Counsel, will, I anticipate, file appeals whenever one might conceivably be
available and let the court sort it all out.
84.

FED. R. APP. P. 15(a).

85. 111 F.3d at 96.
86. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5891 (1994 & Supp. 1997).
87. 111 F.3d at 96 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 5851(c)(1)).

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 97.
Id. at 97 n.2.
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In Legal Environmental Assistance Foundation, Inc. v. EPA,9" the
Eleventh Circuit held the statutory time periods for challenging agency
regulations do not apply if the plaintiff is challenging a regulation as
violative of the underlying statute.94 The Legal Environmental
Assistance Foundation ("LEAF") challenged the Environmental
Protection Agency's ("EPA") underground injection control. ("UIC")
regulations9 5 as inconsistent with the Safe Drinking Water Act
("SDWA7).se Specifically, LEAF argued the EPA's exclusion of hydraulic fracturing from the UIC regulatory regime violated the SDWA.97
The EPA argued the Eleventh Circuit did not have jurisdiction over
LEAF's suit because LEAF's challenge to the UIC regulations "should
have been brought within forty-five days of the promulgation of the
regulations and [wals now time-barred pursuant to [section] 300j7(a)(2)."05
The court rejected EPA's argument by distinguishing
procedural versus substantive challenges to agency regulations-"
Procedural challenges to a regulation, such as an agency's failure to
provide notice and comment during the rule-making process, were bound
by the statutory time period for challenging agency regulations.' °
However, an allegation that an agency regulation was contrary to the
underlying statute was a substantive challenge and was not subject to
the statutory time limit for appealing agency actions.011 An agency
regulation that "'create[d] a rule out of harmony with the statute, [wals
a mere nullity.' ""
o°
Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit ruled it had
subject matter jurisdiction over the suit.0 3 The Eleventh Circuit

93, 118 F.3d 1467 (11th Cir. 1997).
94.

Id. at 1473.

95. The EPA promulgated its UIC regulations at 40 C.F.R. pt. 144. Minimum
requirements for UIC programs delegated to the states are contained in 40 C.F.R. pt. 145.
The EPA promulgated these regulatioris in 1983. See 48 Fed. Reg. 14,189, 14,202 (1983).
96. 118 F.3d at 1472.
97. Id. at 1471.
98. Id. at 1472. The EPA cited Natural Resources Defense Council v. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission ("NRDC v. NRC'), 666 F.2d 595 (D.C. Cir. 1981), in support of its
argument that the court lacked jurisdiction because LEAF had failed to challenge the UIC
regulations within the statutory period. 118 F.3d at 1472.
99. 118 F.3d at 1472. The court said the NRDC v. NRC case cited by EPA distinguished between procedural versus substantive challenges to agency regulations. Only
untimely procedural challenges to agency regulations were barred by the applicable
statutory period. Id.

100. Id.
101. Id. at 1473.
102. Id. (citation omitted).
103. Id
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ultimately found the EPA's UIC regulations void insofar as it excluded
hydraulic fracturing from the UIC regulatory regime."
III.
A.

JUDIcIAL REVIEW OF AGENCY ACTIONS

Deference to an Agency's Statutory Interpretation

Deference to the EPA's interpretation of the SDWA was another issue
5
The
before the court in Legal EnvironmentalAssistance Foundation."'
as
injection
on
underground
SDWA
provision
EPA had interpreted the
As
in
natural
gas
production.
excluding hydraulic fracturing used
previously discussed, the plaintiff LEAF alleged the EPA's hydraulic
fracturing exclusion from the UIC regulations violated the SDWA.'"
The EPA asserted the SDWA was ambiguous on this issue and EPA's
statutory interpretation was "permissible." 10 7 The court noted the
Chevron doctrine,' which required deference to an agency's "permissible" statutory interpretation if congressional intent was ambiguous."°
The Eleventh Circuit made clear that deference to the agency's
interpretation only came into play if the statute was ambiguous."0
examined the statutory definition of "underground injecThe court
1
tion." "
"[U]nderground injection" means the subsurface emplacement of fluids
by forcing them into cavities and passages in the ground through a
well. The process of hydraulic fracturing obviously falls within this
definition, as it involves the subsurface emplacement of fluids by
forcing them into cracks in the ground through a well. Nothing in the
statutory definition suggests that EPA has the authority to exclude
from the reach of the regulations an activity (i.e., hydraulic fracturing)
which unquestionably falls with the plain meaning of the definition
112

Therefore, the SDWA required the EPA to regulate all underground
injection activities, including hydraulic fracturing." 3

104. Id. at 1478.

105. 118 F.3d 1467.
106. Id. at 1469, 1471.
107. Id. at 1473-74.
108. The Chevron doctrine is based on the United States Supreme Court decision in
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. u. NaturalResources Defense Council,Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
109. Legal Envtl. Assistance Found., 118 F.3d at 1473.
110. Id. at 1474.

111. Id.
112. Id. at 1474-75 (footnotes omitted).

113. Id.

958

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49

The EPA asserted two other bases for its SDWA statutory interpretation. The EPA argued its SDWA interpretation regarding underground
injection was entitled to "special deference" because EPA's interpretation
had been consistent over a long period of time." 4 The EPA also
argued that Congress ratified the EPA's SDWA interpretation in the
UIC regulations when Congress amended the SDWA in 1986."' The
court rejected both arguments.116 "[No deference is due to agency
interpretations at odds with the plain language of the statute itself.
Even contemporaneous and long[-]standing agency interpretations must
fall to the extent they conflict with statutory language."" 7
As to the ratification argument, EPA has made no showing that
Congress was aware that EPA's interpretation of "well injection"
excluded hydraulic fracturing.., when Congress reenacted the SDWA

in 1986.

Where "the record of congressional discussion preceding

reenactment makes no reference to the... regulation [at issue], and
there is no other evidence to suggest that Congress was even aware of
the [agency's] interpretive position[,... 'we consider the... reenact-

ment to be without significance..."
The court also said "'where the law is plain, subsequent reenactment
does not constitute an adoption of a previous administrative construction.'" 19 The court held the EPA's UIC regulations excluding hydraulic fracturing were inconsistent with the SDWA and were void. 20
In Tallahassee Memorial Regional Medical Center v. Cook,' 2' the
Eleventh Circuit ruled the Florida Agency for Health Care Administration's ("AHCA") interpretation of Medicaid laws was not entitled to
deference.' 22 The court found AHCA's refusal to reimburse hospitals
for adolescent psychiatric care during "grace days" (when inpatient care
was not medically necessary) violated federal Medicaid laws. 123 The
AHCA was the state agency responsible for operating the Medicaid
program in Florida. 24 Under federal law, if a state elected to include
inpatient psychiatric treatment as part of their Medicaid program, then

114.

Id. at 1477.

115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. (first bracket in original) (quoting Public Employees Retirement Sys. v. Betts,
492 U.S. 158, 171 (1989)).
118. Id. (brackets in original) (quoting Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 121 (1994)).
119. Id. at 1477-78 (brackets in original) (quoting Brown, 513 U.S. at 121).
120. Id.
121. 109 F.3d 693 (11th Cir. 1997).
122. Id. at 703.
123. Id. at 704.
124. Id. at 695.
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hospitals had to provide that care "as long as the medical necessity
exist[ed]." m
The Boren Amendment"2 to the federal Medicaid
program required participating states to reimburse hospitals for their
"reasonable and adequate" costs and to ensure "reasonable access" of
citizens to those hospital services.127
In its per curiam opinion, the Eleventh Circuit appended the district
court's order which included numerous findings."2 Florida had a
severe shortage of outpatient alternative care facilities for adolescent
psychiatric patients."
Plaintiff hospitals had been forced to keep
adolescent psychiatric patients even though inpatient care was no longer
required."8 These patients could not find available alternative care
facilities nor could they be discharged to an unsupervised setting.'
The AHCA refused to reimburse the hospitals for these "grace days"
because
AHCA found inpatient care was no longer a "medical necessi2
13

ty."

The court held the Boren Amendment required reimbursement for
these "grace, days."' 8 Florida's interpretation of the Medicaid law was
"directly contrary to the express mandate of the Boren Amendment and
[wals accordingly not entitled to deference,"" 34
B. Deference to an Agency's Interpretationof Its Regulations
The Eleventh Circuit deferred to the Federal Aviation Administration's
("FAA") interpretation of its regulations regarding pilot qualifications in
Zukas v. Hinson.3 ' Zukas was convicted of transporting cocaine in his
Piper Navajo aircraft. 3 1 More than six months after his drug conviction, the FAA revoked Zukas's commercial pilot certificate.'37
Zukas challenged the certificate revocation as a violation of the "stale
complaint rule,"'" which states: "[wihere the [FAAs] complaint states
allegations of offenses which occurred more than 6 months prior to the

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132,
133,
134,
135.
136,
137.
138,

Id. at 698 (footnote omitted).
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(aX13XA) (1994).
109 F.3d at 699.
Id. at 694-95.
Id. at 700.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 700, 704.
Id. at 703.
124 F.3d 1407, 1411 (11th Cir. 1997).
Id. at 1408.
Id.
49 C.F.R. § 821.33 (1989).
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Administrator's advising [the pilot certificate holder] as to the reasons
for proposed action[,] ... [the pilot certificate holder] may move to
dismiss such allegations ....
""' However, this six-month "stale

complaint" rule did not apply when there were allegations involving pilot
qualifications.'" The FAA asserted its revocation of Zukas's certificate
was based on his lack of pilot qualifications.'
The court found Zukas's drug conviction "implicated his qualifications
to retain his pilot certificate"" and deferred to the FAA's "reasonable
interpretation of its own regulations."'" Thus, the stale complaint
rule did not apply and the FAA's certificate revocation was timely.'"
In Bradberry v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs,145 the Eleventh Circuit reversed an ALhs denial of survivor's
benefits under the Black Lung Benefits program as contrary to the
program Director's interpretation of agency regulations." Under the
Black Lung Benefits program, a family member of a deceased coal miner
was eligible for survivor's benefits if black lung disease (pneumoconiosis)
was a "substantially contributing cause" to the coal miner's death. 47
The program Director's long-standing, consistent interpretation of the
"substantially contributing cause" standard was whether pneumoconiosis
"hastened death to any degree."" The ALJ did not utilize the Director's "hastening death" interpretation of the agency standard, when it
denied survivor benefits to Mrs. Bradberry.'"
The Eleventh Circuit ruled the program Director's interpretation was
entitled to deference and the ALJ should have applied the "hastening
death" interpretation of the standard. 50 The Director's interpretation

139. 124 F.3d at 1410 (brackets in original) (quoting 49 C.F.R. § 821.33).
140. Id. at 1410 (footnote omitted).
141. Id. at 1411.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. 117 F.3d 1361 (11th Cir. 1997).
146. Id. at 1367. Plaintiff, Hattie Bradberry, had pursued her claim through multiple
administrative reviews within the U.S. Department of Labor. When the Labor Department
initially denied her claim, plaintiff requested a hearing before the A.J. Id. at 1363. The

AL denied plaintiffs claim. Id. at 1364. The Benefits Review Board ("BRB") affirmed the
AW's decision. Plaintiff appealed the BRB decision to the Eleventh Circuit. Id.

147. Id. at 1365. See 20 C.F.R. § 718.205(c) (1997).
148. 117 F.3d at 1365 (footnote omitted) (quoting Northern Coal Co. v. Director, Office
of Workers Compensation Program, 100 F.3d 871, 874 (10th Cir. 1996)).
149. Id. at 1364.
150. Id. at 1366-67.
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neither plainly

erroneous nor inconsistent with the regulatory language."'
In University Health Services, Inc. v. Health & Human Services,'52
the court deferred to the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services' ("HHS") interpretation of its Medicare guidance manual
regarding payment of bad debt claims."'3 The HHS Secretary denied
payment of plaintiff's Medicare bad debt claims.'r" The HHS Secretary
found the plaintiff exerted more effort to collect its non-Medicare debts
than it did 15 5to collect its Medicare debts, in violation of Medicare
regulations.

Federal Medicare regulations required health care providers to make
reasonable efforts to collect from Medicare patients prior to submitting
a bad debt claim for reimbursement."5 6 The HHS had published a
"Provider Reimbursement Manual" ("PRM") to provide additional
guidance to health care providers on bad debt claims and other Medicare
reimbursements." 7 Section 310 of the PRM required health care
providers to make "similar" efforts to collect both Medicare and nonHowever, section 310.2 of the PRM stated that a
Medicare claims.'
debt was presumed to be uncollectible "[ilf after reasonable and
customary attempts to collect a bill, the debt remain[ed] unpaid more
than 9120 days from the date the first bill [wals mailed to the beneficia15

ry."

The HHS Secretary denied plaintiff's bad debt claims because plaintiff
sent its non-Medicare debts to an in-house collection agency after 120
days, but did not make further collection efforts on the Medicare
debts."6 Plaintiff argued that once a Medicare debt reached 120 days,
310.2 indicated no further collection efforts were rePRM section
16
quired.

1

The Eleventh Circuit explained when it would defer to an agency's
interpretation of its own regulations. "Although an agency's interpretive
rules do not have the force of law, the Secretary's interpretation of her
own regulations are 'controlling unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent

151. Id. at 1366 (footnote omitted).

152. 120 F.3d 1145 (11th Cir. 1997).
153. Id.at 1150.
154. Id, at 1148.

155. Id.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id. at 1147.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1148.
Id. at 1148-49.
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' 2 The HHS Secretary
with the regulation. ""
interpreted sections 310
and 310.2 of the PRM as follows:

PRM § 310 requires similar treatment of all patient accounts of
comparable size regardless of the point in time at which the collection
effort is measured. PRM § 310.2 [the 120-day collection rule] does not
come into effect unless the provider has complied with PRM § 310 in
treating identically all Medicare and non-Medicare accounts and has
ceased collection efforts with regard to all accounts after 120 days.'"
The court found the HHS Secretary's interpretation of the two PRM
provisions was "plausible and consistent with the [Medicare] regulations
directive that a provider expend reasonable collection efforts before
claiming and receiving [Medicare] reimbursement ... ."'
The
Eleventh Circuit ruled HHS's interpretation of the PRM guidelines was
not "arbitrary, plainly erroneous, or inconsistent with Medicare
policy."'
Therefore, the court was "bound to give controlling weight
to the Secretary's interpretation of the governing regulation and
accompanying guidelines."'6
IV. AGENCY RULE-MAKING AND SUBPOENA POWERS
In University Health Services, Inc.,67 plaintiff alleged the HHS
Secretary's retroactive disallowance of plaintiff's 1986 bad debt claim
constituted improper "retroactive rule-making."" Plaintiff said HHS's
past policy had been to pay (through its Blue Cross intermediary)
Medicare bad debt claims that remained outstanding after 120 days. 69
In this case, Blue Cross conducted an audit of the 1986 bad debt
claim. 7 0 Blue Cross found that plaintiff had submitted Medicare debts
that were uncollected after 120 days to HHS for reimbursement, but sent
its non-Medicare debts (over 120 days) to an in-house collection
agency.171 Prior to this audit, Blue Cross was not aware of plaintiff's
differing collection procedures for Medicare versus non-Medicare
debts. 72 Blue Cross, with HHS approval, disallowed the 1986 bad

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Id. (quoting Auer v. Robbins, 117 S. Ct. 905, 911 (1997)).
Id. at 1149.
Id. at 1150.
Id.
Id,
120 F.3d 1145 (11th Cir. 1997).
Id. at 1149.
Id. at 1148.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1150.
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debts claim because plaintiffs debt collection practices were "inconsistent
with Medicare policy."7 '
The court noted the same agency guidelines on bad debt claims were
in effect during the time plaintiff alleged a "rule change" occurred. 74
More importantly, Blue Cross discovered new information about
plaintiff's non-Medicare versus Medicare claims."' Blue Cross denied
the reimbursement of plaintiff's Medicare bad debts claim based upon
the new information. 7 " The court rejected plaintiff's argument that
HHS had engaged in "retroactive rule-making."17 7 "[The] University
fail[ed] to demonstrate how this decision [denying reimbursement of the
University's claim] constitutes a substantive change or a different
application of the Secretary's policy prohibiting dissimilar treatment of
Medicare and non-Medicare accounts as embodied in PRM § 310. " 78
In Inspector Generalof the United States Departmentof Agriculture v.

Glenn,"9 defendants appealed the district court decision upholding the
USDA IG's subpoenas to defendants.8 ° The Eleventh Circuit affirmed
the district court finding that the IG subpoenas were authorized by
federal law and were not indefinite or unduly burdensome.'
The USDA IG received a hotline complaint of possible fraud in
disaster payments to Mitchell County, Georgia participants. 8 2 In
response to the hotline complaint, the USDA IG audited the Consolidated Farm Service Agency's ("CFSA") Mitchell County disaster program." s When defendants refused the IG's request for information,
the IG issued subpoenas and sought judicial enforcement.,"'
The Eleventh Circuit reviewed the statutory basis of the IG's subpoena
power. The Inspector General Act of 1978 ("IGA') 8 ' authorized
inspectors general to issue subpoenas as part of their investigations into
The court set forth three criteria for judging the
fraud and abuse.'
validity of the USDA's subpoenas to the defendants: "(1) the Inspector

173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
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Id. at 1148, 1150.
Id. at 1150.
Id.
Id.

Id.
Id. (footnote omitted).
122 F.3d 1007 (11th Cir. 1997).
Id. at 1008-09.
Id.
Id. at 1009.
Id.
Id.
5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-12 (1994).
122 F.3d at 1008-09.
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General's investigation [wals within its authority; (2) the subpoenas
demand [wals not too indefinite or overly burdensome; (3) and [sic] the
information sought [wals reasonably relevant. 18 7
As to the first criteria, the Eleventh Circuit examined the legislative
history of the IGA to determine when IG audits were authorized. The
IGA's legislative history suggested that such audits were to have three
basic areas of inquiry:
(1) examinations of financial transactions, accounts, and reports and
reviews of compliance with applicable laws and regulations, (2) reviews
of efficiency and economy to determine whether the audited entity is
giving due consideration to economical and efficient management,
utilization, and conservation of its resources and to minimum expenditure of effort, and (3) reviews of program results to determine whether
programs or activities meet the objectives established by Congress or
the establishment. 1
The court found the IGA authorized broad subpoena power to effectively
discharge their audit responsibilities under the statute." 9
The Eleventh Circuit also noted a Fifth Circuit decision that IGs "do
not have authority to conduct regulatory compliance audits 'which are
most appropriately viewed as being within the authority of the agency
itself.'"'" Defendants challenged the USDA subpoenas as a regulatory
compliance audit that only the CFSA had the authority to conduct.' 91

The Eleventh Circuit distinguished the Fifth Circuit case, which did not
involve an IG investigation in response to "a specific allegation of fraud
and abuse" in an agency program."2
The defendants also argued the IG was only authorized to detect fraud
and abuse within government agencies, not fraud and abuse by
participants in those agency programs."
The court rejected this
argument:
While we agree that IGA's main function is to detect abuse within

agencies themselves, the IGA's legislative history indicates that
Inspectors General are permitted and expected to investigate public
involvement with the programs in certain situations ....
[W]e

conclude that the Inspector General's public contact in this case was

187. Id. at 1009.
188. Id. at 1010 (quoting S. Rep. No. 95-1071, at 30 (1978)).
189. Id. at 1010-11.
190. Id. (quoting Burlington N. R.R. v. Office of Inspector General R.R. Retirement Bd.,
983 F.2d 631, 642 (5th Cir. 1993)).
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
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appropriate because it occurred during the course of an investigation
into alleged misuse of taxpayer dollars."
After deciding the USDA IG's subpoenas were within the IGA's
statutory authority, the court also disposed of defendants' allegations
that the subpoenas were too indefinite and unduly burdensome. 95
Defendants argued the IG could not request records beyond the two-year
power
The court said the IG's subpoena
statutory retention period.'
197
could reach records "created prior to the retention period."
The court also rejected defendants' argument that the subpoenas were
unduly burdensome because one of the defendants, Mr. Griffin, lacked
the mental capacity to explain his recordkeeping system.'" The court
noted the IG had not requested an explanation from Mr. Griffin
Therefore, Mr. Griffin's mental
regarding his recordkeeping system.'
capacity had no bearing on the enforceability of the IG subpoenas."°
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200.

Id. (footnote omitted) (citation omitted).
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